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“One can't have something for nothing. Happiness has got to be paid
for.”1
INTRODUCTION
Of all the conflicts in Africa’s documented history, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Congo”) is considered the home
of the deadliest conflict thus far.2 Though the Congo’s civil war ended
in 2002, the humanitarian crisis remains – where dangerous and
armed rebel groups routinely engage in rape, torture, exploitation of
children, and other harmful activities.3 The conflict in the Congo
1. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 170 (1932).
2. See Shannon Raj, Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the Legislation
that Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 984 (2011) (describing the Congo’s
conflict among Africa’s documented history).
3. See Marcia Narine, Emerging Issues in Social Enterprise: From Kansas to the Congo:
Why Naming and Shaming Corporations Through the Dodd-Frank’s Act’s Corporate
Governance Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights Crisis, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 358
(2012) (discussing what devastating occurrences are associated with the Congo’s mineral
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covers a wide range of tensions, from internal and regional struggles,
to strains over identity, ethnicity, and resources.4 In 2010, the United
Nations described the conflict in the Congo as one of the worst
humanitarian crises in the world.5 A significant part of this crisis is
the mineral trade and the conflict surrounding it.6 The damaging
conflict that has existed for decades in the Congo is further
exacerbated by the armed forces financing themselves through
controlling the country’s mineral mines and mining communities.7
Because militias and armies in the Congo vie for control over
these mines, the struggle for power over these sources of wealth often
involves armed violence and human rights abuses that thrive under
the country’s weak governance framework.8 Militias in the Congo
extort and implement taxation along different stages of the mineral
trade, forcing buyers to pay bribes at roadblocks and border
crossings.9 The armed forces then use this money to purchase more
weapons, further fueling the violence.10 It has been estimated that
armed groups in the Congo were enriched with US$185 million per
year from the mineral trade.11
trade); see also Raj, supra note 2, at 989-90 (noting the prevalence of rape and sexual torture
in the Congo).
4. See Raj, supra note 2, at 985 (describing the range of conflict within the Congo).
5. See id. at 988 (describing the contribution of the mineral trade to the conflict in the
Congo).
6. Id.
7. Id. See also Alexandrea L. Nelson, The Materiality of Morality: Conflict Minerals,
UTAH L. REV. 219, 222 (2014) (discussing the violent methods of armed groups used to
maintain control over mining communities in the Congo).
8. See Joshua A. Feinzeig, Promoting World Peace Through the Use of the “Good
Book”: Implementing Foreign Policy Through the Tax Code, 40 BROOK J. INT’L. L. 953, 959
(2015) (discussing the role of armed forces in the mineral trade); David C.W. Wagner,
Breaking the Nexus Between Armed Conflict and Consumer Products: Where’s the App For
That?, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 103, 130 (2012) (mentioning the weak governance in the
Congo); see also Karen Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2012) (noting
that mineral resources provide funding for violent militias).
9. See Raj, supra note 2, at 989 (discussing the militias and their systematic extortion
and taxation); see also Wagner, supra note 8, at 107 (listing extortion techniques of armed
groups in the Congo).
10. See Raj, supra note 2, at 989 (discussing the militias and their systematic extortion
and taxation); see also Wagner, supra note 8, at 107 (listing extortion techniques of armed
groups in the Congo).
11. See David Smith, Congo Mines No Longer in Grip of Warlords and Militias, Says
Report, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2014, 1:05 P.M.), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun
/11/congo-mines-no-longer-grip-warlords-militias-report-enough-project
(discussing
the
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“Conflict Minerals” are known as minerals mined under
conditions of armed conflict and human rights abuses, specifically in
the eastern provinces of the Congo.12 These minerals are tin, tantalum
(also known as columbine tantalum or “coltan”), tungsten, and gold,
and are sometimes collectively referred to as “3T+G.”13 These
minerals largely originate from central Africa, particularly the eastern
Congo and its neighboring countries, Uganda and Rwanda.14
Various electronic products are reported to contain Conflict
Minerals originating from the Congo and its prevalent mineral trade.15
Multiple steps are involved before raw minerals like 3T+G make it
into the consumer market and electronics.16 These steps are part of the
supply chain, which is a system of all activities, organizations, actors,
technology, information, resources, and services that bring raw
minerals from its extraction site to the final product for consumers.17
Though it has been widely reported that many companies, such as
technology company giant Apple Inc. (“Apple”), may manufacture
advantages of US conflict mineral legislation); A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s
Conflict Minerals - Strategy Paper, ENOUGH PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2009),
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensive-approach-conflict-mineralsstrategy-paper; see also Allison M. Blake, SEC Cannot Clean the Electronics Industry Alone:
“Blood Minerals” Mandatory Disclosure Legislation Effective Only If Applied Across the
Board, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 395, 398 (providing estimated profits from the mineral trade).
12 See What are Conflict Minerals, SOURCE INTELLIGENCE, https://www.
sourceintelligence.com/what-are-conflict-minerals/ (detailing what minerals are commonly
considered to be Conflict Minerals).
13. See Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716 §I(A), n.6 (Aug. 22,
2012) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule Release].
14. See Emily Veale, Is There Blood on Your Hands-Free Device?: Examining
Legislative Approached to the Conflict Minerals Problem in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 504 (2013) (discussing the origins of conflict
minerals).
15. See Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 953 (stating that “minerals are found in commonplace
electronic devices that people around the world depend upon in their daily routines.”); Narine,
supra note 3, at 359 (stating that “almost every consumer product that requires electronics uses
one of the four regulated minerals collectively known as the “3Ts+G.”); Raj, supra note 2, at
989 (discussing different components of electronics often comprised of Conflict Minerals);
Veale, supra note 14, at 515-16 (detailing the link between the use of electronics and Conflict
Minerals).
16. These steps are: extraction, transport, handling, trading, processing, smelting,
refining and alloying, manufacturing, and sale of end product. See OECD Due Diligence
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk
Areas, OECD PUBLISHING 4 (2d ed. 2013) https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/
GuidanceEdition2.pdf [hereinafter OECD Due Diligence Guidance].
17. Id. at 14.
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products containing Conflict Minerals, the exact percentage of these
products is difficult to quantify because of a lack of transparency
within global supply chains.18 The difficulty of quantifying an exact
percentage is likely due to the fact that global supply chains include
multiple tiers of suppliers that cannot be easily traced.19 To illustrate
this difficulty, an employee of technology company, Phillips, stated
that, “for electronic components, the supply chain can easily be fifty
tiers deep,” where many suppliers provide the company with limited
or no information regarding its origins.20
Arguably, consumers of products containing these minerals have
a “direct hand” in the ongoing crisis in the Congo.21 As US
Congressman Jim McDermott stated, one of the issues that goes
largely unnoticed for a majority of Americans is that no one is
thinking of the Congo or Conflict Minerals, yet every cell phone user
most likely has Conflict Minerals every time they make a call,
“potentially, right next to their ear.”22 Since Conflict Minerals are
often key components of many devices, consumers may be financing
the conflict surrounding the mineral trade by continuously buying
new electronics, particularly smartphones.23 As previously mentioned,
18. See Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J.
419, 431 (2015) (discussing the lack of transparency within global supply chains); see
generally OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 16, at 14.
19. See Victor Luckerson, There May Be Conflict Minerals in Your Smartphone, TIME
(June 3, 2014), http://time.com/2819594/conflict-minerals-apple-google-intel-amazon/ (stating
that “because such materials travel through a variety of smelters, manufacturers and
distributors before they end up in a phone or laptop, vetting the entire manufacturing line is a
difficult, expensive process”); see also Sarfaty, supra note 18, at 431-32 (discussing the lack
of transparency within global supply chains).
20. Sarfaty, supra note 18, at 431-32 (illustrating the difficulty of tracking global supply
chains).
21. Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 954 (discussing how consumers indirectly fund the conflict
mineral trade).
22. Mary Beth Sheridan, U.S. Financial Reform Bill Also Targets ‘Conflict Minerals’
from Congo, WASH. POST (July 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/20/AR2010072006212.html. Jim McDermott was a member of
the US House of Representatives for the state of Washington from 1989-2017. Jim McDermott
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index
Biography,
CONGRESS.GOV,
=M000404.
23. See Ved P. Nanda, Conflict Minerals and International Business: United States and
International Responses, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285, 286 (“Consumer demand for cell
phones, laptops, appliances, and jewelry fuels this trade and triggers the conflicts.”); see also
Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 953 (stating that “minerals are found in commonplace electronic
devices that people around the world depend upon in their daily routines”); Narine, supra note
3, at 359 (stating “almost every consumer product that requires electronics uses one of the four
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the armed groups in the Congo exploit the region’s mineral wealth to
enrich themselves and maintain control through violent methods.24
With high consumer demand for devices such as smartphones, there is
a chance that minerals within electronic devices originated from
mines controlled by these dangerous armed groups.25
Each mineral is often found in various products.26 The Congo is
the sixth largest manufacturer of tin, which is used as a solder on
circuit boards, and produces about twenty percent of the world’s
tantalum, which is found in cell phones, digital cameras, and portable
music players.27 Tungsten is used to make cell phones vibrate, and
gold is frequently used in constructing electronics.28 In 2015, it was
reported that in the United States alone, nearly two-thirds of its
population now owns a smartphone, and fifteen percent of the
population ages eighteen to twenty-nine are reported to be heavily
dependent on their smartphones for online access.29 Globally, there
are approximately 2.6 billion smartphone users.30 By 2020, this
number is expected to jump to 6.1 billion.31 Total global smartphone
shipments were estimated to be 341.5 million in 2016, a one percent
increase from the 338 million smartphones shipped in 2015.32 One
regulated minerals collectively known as the “3Ts+G”); Raj, supra note 2, at 989 (discussing
different components of electronics often comprised of Conflict Minerals); Veale, supra note
14, at 515-16 (detailing the link between the use of electronics and Conflict Minerals).
24. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
25. See Nanda, supra note 23, at 286 (“Consumer demand for cell phones, laptops,
appliances, and jewelry fuels this trade and triggers the conflicts.”)
26. See infra notes 27-28.
27. See Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 959 (discussing the Congo’s abundant mineral wealth).
28. Gold is a key source of mineral wealth in the Congo, with armed groups receiving
profits as much as US$88 million annually. See Raj, supra note 2, at 989 (discussing how
Conflict Minerals are used in electronic devices); Erin Banco, Is Your Cell Phone Fueling
Civil War in Congo?, ATLANTIC (July 11, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2011/07/is-your-cell-phone-fueling-civil-war-in-congo/241663/
(detailing the purpose of Conflict Minerals in cell phones).
29. Aaron Smith, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015 (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/ (examining the role of
smartphones in the United States).
30. Ingrid Lunden, 6.1B Smartphone Users Globally By 2020, Overtaking Basic Fixed
Phone Subscriptions, TECH CRUNCH (June 2, 2015) https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/02/6-1bsmartphone-users-globally-by-2020-overtaking-basic-fixed-phone-subscriptions/.
31. See id. at 30 (providing number of smartphone users worldwide).
32. See Daniel Eran Dilger, Strategy Analytics: Apple’s iPhone 6s the World’s Most
Popular Smartphone in Q2, APPLE INSIDER (Sept. 6, 2016), http://appleinsider.com/articles/
16/09/06/strategy-analytics-apples-iphone-6s-the-worlds-most-popular-smartphone-in-q2.
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glaring example of the pervasiveness of smartphones is the iPhone,
manufactured by Apple.33 As of early 2016, Apple’s iPhone remains
the top choice by consumers in two of the world’s largest smartphone
markets: the United States and China.34 Moreover, as of July 2016
total global iPhone sales have reached approximately one billion.35
This Note examines the United States’ Conflict Minerals
legislation, specifically Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), a
provision aimed at combating the human rights abuses and conflict
associated with the Congolese mineral trade, and compares this
provision to a similar forthcoming regulation in the European
Union.36 Part I discusses the conflict associated with the Congo
mineral trade and the history behind this conflict. Part II details the
background behind Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and analyzes
the effects of this provision on the Congo. Part III then reviews the
European Union’s current Conflict Minerals regulation proposal and
the process behind it. Lastly, Part IV argues that the European Union
should learn from the shortcomings of Section 1502 when finalizing
their own Conflict Minerals regulation. This Part provides
33. See Lance Whitney, iPhone is Top Phone Brand in US and China, CNET (Jan. 27,
2016), https://www.cnet.com/news/iphone-once-again-top-phone-in-us-and-china/ (discussing
the Apple iPhone’s continuing popularity). It is important to note that Apple now audits 100%
of its suppliers for links to conflict minerals. See Emily Chasan, Apple Says Supply Chain Now
(Mar.
30,
2016),
100%
Audited
for
Conflict
Minerals,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-30/apple-says-supply-chain-now-100audited-for-conflict-minerals. However, one must keep in mind that Apple auditing 100% of
its mineral suppliers does not necessarily mean its products are now Conflict Mineral free,
which Apple acknowledges and recognizes. See Carly Oboth, Why It’s a Good Thing Apple
Isn’t Declaring its Products Conflict-Free, GLOBAL WITNESS (Apr. 11, 2016),
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/why-its-good-thing-apple-isnt-declaring-its-productsconflict-free/ (discussing Apple’s Conflict Minerals Report where Apple states “Apple does
not believe that Third Party Audit program participation alone is sufficient to label products
‘conflict free.’ Apple believes it has more work to do.”).
34. See Whitney, supra note 33 (discussing the Apple iPhone’s continuing popularity).
35. See Sam Costello, How Many iPhones Have Been Sold Worldwide?, LIFEWIRE (Nov.
3, 2016), http://ipod.about.com/od/glossary/f/how-many-iphones-sold.htm; Nick Statt, 1
Billion Apple Devices Are in Active Use Around the World, VERGE (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/26/10835748/apple-devices-active-1-billion-iphone-ipad-ios.
36. The Dodd-Frank Act was passed in the United States as legislation aimed at financial
regulatory reform to create a robust foundation for lasting economic growth and job creation in
the United States. Wall-Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform
(last
accessed Oct. 9, 2016).
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recommendations on how the European Union can produce a stronger
means of combating Conflict Mineral related human rights violations.
I. CONFLICT IN THE CONGO
To better understand the complexities of the conflict behind the
mineral trade, Part I provides a brief overview of the history behind
Congo’s mineral exploitation and its effects. The following also
details what fuels the present-day conflict occurring in the Congo.
Lastly, the effects of this present-day conflict are discussed and the
profitability of the Conflict Mineral industry is estimated.
A. Origins of the Conflict
In the late 19th century, the Congo was victim to brutal
colonization by King Leopold II of Belgium.37 Leopold exploited the
Congo’s natural resources through tyrannical practices, such as
widespread slave labor.38 After experiencing pressure from the Great
Powers condemning his brutality in the Congo, Leopold transferred
control of the Congo Free State to the Belgian government in 1908.39
His profits from his twenty-year exploitation of the Congo were
approximately US$1.1 billion when calculating by today’s
standards.40 In 1960, Belgium accepted the Congo’s independence.41
Shortly thereafter, the Congo’s new government faced national
mutiny and threats from numerous secession movements.42 Cold War
tensions fueled the Congo’s leadership struggle, with the United
States fearing that Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba would break-up
the Congo and allow Soviet control of central Africa.43 Supported by
the United States and Belgium, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu

37. Roots of the Crisis – Congo, ENOUGH PROJECT, http://www.enoughproject.org/
conflict_areas/eastern_congo/roots-crisis (last accessed Oct. 17, 2016) (detailing the
background behind the violent conflict in the Congo).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Anne DeVoe, Carrying A Piece of Congo in Our Pockets: Global Complicity to
Congo’s Sexual Violence and the Conflict Minerals Trade, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 463, 472
(2011) (detailing the Congo’s long history of conflict).
41. Roots of the Crisis – Congo, supra note 37.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba, who was arrested and
assassinated in 1961.44
In 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko ousted President Kasavubu in a coup
to gain control of the government, with help from the United States
and Belgium.45 Seko used the Congo’s mineral wealth to fight off
rivals, enrich himself and his allies through a system of corruption so
severe that the country was soon labeled a “kleptocracy.”46 Seko also
allowed officials to steal so he could avoid paying them.47 Three
decades later, about 800,000 ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus were
killed in the Rwandan Genocide by Rwanda’s Hutu extremist
government.48 Those responsible for the genocide fled to the Congo,
where Seko allowed them to launch attacks against Rwanda while in
the Congo.49 Many Hutus from Rwanda who had committed extreme
human rights abuses also moved into the Congo, heightening the
conflict in the region further.50 In 1997, rebels ousted Seko, and
Laurent Kabila became president and remained in that position until
his assassination by one of his bodyguards.51 His son, Joseph Kabila,
succeeded him eight days later and is the current president.52
44. Id.
45. Id;
DR
Congo
country
profile,
BBC
(Nov.
15,
2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13283212; The Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold
War, 1960–1965 , U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/congo-decolonization.
46. A kleptocracy is a type of government where a country’s ruler uses political power to
pilfer the country’s resources. See Roots of the Crisis – Congo, supra note 37; see also Howard
W. French, Anatomy of an Autocracy: Mobutu’s 32-Year Reign, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 1997),
https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/051797zaire-mobutu.html.
47. Will Kabila Go?, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2015) http://www.economist.com/news/
middle-east-and-africa/21679750-war-weary-citizens-are-scared-joseph-kabila-may-not-retiregracefully-will.
48. The Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Short Timeline, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO,
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/democratic-republic-congo-short-timeline
(providing historical timeline of significant events in the Congo) (last accessed Nov. 6, 2016);
RTS.
WATCH
(Aug.
21,
2009)
DR
Congo:
Chronology,
HUM.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/21/dr-congo-chronology#_War
(detailing
extensive
chronology of significant events in the Congo). The Hutus and Tutsis are African ethnic
groups. See Hutu and Tutsi History, HUM. RTS. WATCH (1999), https://www.hrw.org/
reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-09.htm.
49. Roots of the Crisis – Congo, supra note 37.
50. Katherine D. Van Marter, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Unintended
Consequences of the Conflict Minerals Rule, 24 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 293
(discussing the beginnings of the conflict in the Congo).
51. Roots of the Crisis – Congo, supra note 37.
52. Id.
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B. The Conflict Behind “Conflict Minerals”
Although the Seko’s reign in the Congo ended nearly a decade
ago, the exploitation of the mineral trade is still prevalent today.53 The
vast majority of the Congo’s mineral resources is located in its
Eastern region, which is currently controlled by four armed groups.54
The four groups are: (1) Forces Democratiques de Liberation du
Rwanda (“FDLR”), (2) Congres national pour la defense du people
(“CNDP”), (3) Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du
Congo (“FARDC,” or the Congolese National Army), and (4) various
Mai Mai militias.55 Of these groups, the FARDC are considered
“official forces,” while the FDLR and Mai Mai militias are
considered the “rebel groups.”56
The FDLR, an ethnic Hutu militia, is considered one of the most
feared groups, and is known to ally with smaller militias and the
Congolese army.57 UN investigators have connected the FDLR to
various attacks in the eastern Congo region.58 According to UN
investigators, the attacks in the eastern Congo are linked to
competition between the FDLR and other groups over the mineral
trade and control over the mineral mines.59
Pursuant to a March 2009 peace deal with the Congolese
government, the CNDP integrated its forces with FARDC.60 The
peace deal provided for the transformation of the CNDP to a political
party integrated with FARDC, in exchange for the release of the

53. See generally Tom Burgis, Dodd-Frank’s Misadventures in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, POLITICO MAG. (May 10, 2015), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2015/05/dodd-frank-democratic-republic-of-congo-117583); Lauren Wolfe,
How Dodd-Frank is Failing the Congo, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 2, 2015),
foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/02/how-dodd-frank-is-failing-congo-mining-conflict-minerals/.
54. Veale, supra note 14, at 512-13 (discussing armed groups implicated in the crisis
within the Congo).
55. Id.
56. The Eastern Congo, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/congodemocratic-republic-of/eastern-congo/p37236#!/ (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016).
57. PETER EICHSTAEDT, CONSUMING THE CONGO: WAR AND CONFLICT MINERALS IN
THE WORLD’S DEADLIEST PLACE, Prologue (2011).
58. Veale, supra note 14, at 513.
59. Veale, supra note 14, at 512-13. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Peace
Agreement Between the Government and the National Congress for the Defence of the People
(CNDP) (Mar. 23, 2009) [hereinafter CNDP Peace Deal].
60. See CNDP Peace Deal, supra note 59; Veale, supra note 14, at 514.
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CNDP’s former members captured by the Congolese government.61
However, this agreement has done little to diminish the conflict in
eastern Congo.62 The same rebel units within the CNDP still occupy
the same territory, yet now they are under the façade of government.63
Though FARDC was established to end violence in the Congo,
various warlords incorporated their men in FARDC in name only,
maintaining divided command structures, rather than a unification of
the various rebel groups as mandated by the peace deal.64
C. Tangible Effects of the Conflict
As previously mentioned, the violence surrounding the mineral
trade has intensified conflict already present in the Congo for
decades.65 The mineral trade has funded armed groups who have
heightened human rights abuses in the Congo for years.66 The armed
groups responsible for violently fighting over mineral mines are also
considered responsible for the civilian-directed violence.67 In addition
to extorting and implementing taxation at roadblocks and border
crossings, forcing mineral buyers to pay bribes at roadblocks and
border crossings, and using this money to purchase more weapons,
armed groups in local mining areas control the population through the
methods of kidnap and rape.68

61. DR Congo Government, CNDP rebels 'sign peace deal', AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
(Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/DR_Congo_government_
CNDP_rebels_sign_peace_deal_999.html; Michael Deibert, Congo peace deal was doomed to
failure, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/21/congom23-deal-goma.
62. Veale, supra note 14, at 514.
63. Id.
64. Id; DR Congo Government, CNDP rebels 'sign peace deal', supra note 61.
65. See supra Section I.A; Brian Stuart Silverman, One Mineral at a Time: Shaping
Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility Through Dodd-Frank Section 1502, 16 OR.
REV. INT’L L. 127, at 133-34 (“The D.R. Congo has been mired in conflict for the better part
of the last two decades.”)
66. Conflict Minerals, GLOBAL WITNESS, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/
conflict-minerals/#more (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016).
67. Silverman, supra note 65, at 134 (discussing the violence within the Congo’s mining
communities; see also Narine supra note 3, at 381 (detailing the conflict Congolese civilians
are often subjected to).
68. Harry D. Gobrecht, Technically Correct: Using Technology to Supplement Due
Diligence Standards in Eastern D.R. Congo Conflict Minerals Mining, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 413, 418 (2011); see also Raj, supra note 2.
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One of the most devastating elements of the conflict is the
ongoing rape epidemic.69 In 2010, a study estimated that around 1.8
million Congolese women have been victims of rape.70 Most of the
perpetrators in the eastern Congo region are said to be government
soldiers or militia fighters, and some have been reported to be
Congolese police.71 Rape is considered pervasive in this region
because of the Congo’s corrupt court system, and perpetrators are
often confident they will suffer no consequences.72 Although the
Congolese parliament reformed the country’s rape laws in recent
years, some have doubted its effectiveness since prosecuting rape not
a high priority as it is expensive and time-consuming.73 Because
perpetrators are often the armed forces or rebel groups who depend on
mineral wealth to make a profit, the rape epidemic is strongly
associated with the mineral trade.74 Sexual violence and rape are
considered “common tools” used by these armed groups to preserve
control and power over mining communities.75 Government
corruption is rampant in the region, so much so that the Congo’s
security forces are unable to adequately protect communities from
armed forces “poorly disciplined, ill equipped, and the worst abusers
of human rights in the [Congo].”76

69. See Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the
Congo); McDermott Bill, infra note 97, at §2.
70. See Nelson, supra note 7, at 222 (discussing the violent methods of armed groups
used to maintain control over mining communities in the Congo).
71. See Narine supra note 3, at 377 (listing the common perpetrators of rape in the
Congo); see also Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the
Congo).
72. See Narine supra note 3, at 377 (listing the common perpetrators of rape in the
Congo); see also Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the
Congo).
73. See Narine supra note 3, at 377 (listing the common perpetrators of rape in the
Congo); see also Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the
Congo).
74. See Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the
Congo); see also Narine, supra note 3, at 381 (discussing the conflict over minerals, “[r]ebels
loot, pillage, rape, and murder innocent civilians for a host of complex reasons, including for
their minerals”).
75. See Nelson, supra note 7, at 222 (discussing the violent methods of armed groups
used to maintain control over mining communities in the Congo).
76. Id.
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Another devastating element of the conflict in the Congo is the
gruesome child labor in the region.77 Although the region has made
strides towards the improvement of child labor conditions by
implementing a UN-backed action plan to end the recruitment and use
of child soldiers, Congolese children still engage in harrowing forms
of child labor–the mining of Conflict Minerals.78 Mining often
involves sifting, cleaning, sorting, working underground, transporting,
carrying heavy loads, use of mercury and explosives, and digging in
the production of different minerals.79 Children are described to be the
most vulnerable to mine owners who do not want to pay for
workers.80 Rather, mine owners or managers will exploit children’s
hunger by offering a single meal for mining work, or promising the
fun of adventure.81 Children are also preferred as miners because their
smaller bodies enable them to go down narrow, yet dangerous mining
shafts.82
II. DODD-FRANK’S SECTION 1502
The United States has taken measures to address the ongoing
conflict related to the mineral trade through comprehensive
77. According to the US Department of Labor’s 2015 report on child labor in the Congo,
the penalties for forced or compulsory child labor do little to deter armed forces from forcing
children to engage in dangerous labor. The US Department of Labor lists various child labor
laws in the Congo. Some relevant to the discussion of children mining conflict minerals are:
(1) Minimum Age of Work is 16 under Article 6 of the Labor Code; Article 50 of the Child
Protection Code (75, 76); (2) Minimum Age for Hazardous Work is 18 under Article 10 of the
Ministerial Order Establishing the Conditions for Children’s Work (77); (3) Prohibition of
Hazardous Occupations or Activities for Children under Articles 28–35 of Ministerial Order
on Working Conditions for Women and Children; Articles 10–15 of the Ministerial Order
Establishing the Conditions for Children’s Work; Article 26 of the Mining Code (77-79); and
(4) Prohibition of Forced Labor under Articles 2 and 3 of the Labor Code; Articles 53 and 187
of the Child Protection Code; Articles 16 and 61 of the Constitution; Article 8 of the
Ministerial Order Establishing the Conditions for Children’s Work (59, 75-77). Congo’s Child
Protection Code established a penalty of one to three years imprisonment and small fines for
forced child labor, while the Ministry of Mines drafted a code calling for a punishment of five
to ten years for forced child labor in mining sites. Off. of Child Lab., Forced Lab., and Hum.
Trafficking, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (2015)
[hereinafter USDOL Report].
78. USDOL Report, supra note 77.
79. Id.
80. ZORBA LESLIE ET AL., THE CONGO REPORT: SLAVERY IN CONFLICT MINERALS 12
(2011) (detailing the several types of slavery within the Congo’s mines).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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legislation. First, this Part describes the United States’ early attempts
at formulating Conflict Mineral legislation. Next, this Part examines
the United States’ final version of Conflict Minerals legislation,
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the reasons behind why the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was ultimately chosen
as its enforcer, and which alternative agencies that many believe may
be better equipped to enforce Section 1502. Lastly, this Part analyzes
the effects of this provision on the Congolese people.
A. The United States Approach: Disclosure
The touchstone of Section 1502 is disclosure, as evidenced by
Congress’ focus on disclosure as a remedy to the Conflict Minerals
problem.83 This section discusses the background behind Section
1502, and the various pieces of legislation preceding this provision.
Additionally, this section reviews different suggestions addressing the
Conflict Minerals problem, along with the effects of Section 1502 on
the Congo and its people.
1. Early Attempts at Addressing the Conflict Minerals Problem
Then-US Senator Barack Obama introduced the DRC Relief,
Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (“2006 Congo
Act”), later signed into law by President Bush.84 The 2006 Congo Act
established United States policy objectives addressing various
humanitarian, social and economic development concerns in the
Congo.85 The 2006 Congo Act also provided potential consequences
for any country “meddling” in the Congo.86 Here, the Secretary of
83. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-18
(2010).
84. See Democratic Republic of Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-457, §1502(a), 120 Stat. 3384 (2010) [hereinafter 2006 Congo Act];
see also Narine, supra note 3. George W. Bush was the 43rd president of the United States.
See George W. Bush Biography, http://www.biography.com/people/george-w-bush-9232768.
President Bush signed the 2006 Congo Act into law during his second term of presidency.
During this time, President Obama was senator for the state of Illinois. See Barack Obama
Biography, http://www.biography.com/people/barack-obama-12782369.
85. See 2006 Congo Act, supra note 84; see also Narine, supra note 3, at 381.
86. See Armin Rosen, The U.S. Ally That Brings Violence to the Congo and Gets Away
With It, ATLANTIC (Jul. 13, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2012/07/the-us-ally-that-brings-violence-to-the-congo-and-gets-away-with-it/259777/;
see also 2006 Congo Act, supra note 84.
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State is authorized to withhold assistance made available under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 if the Secretary determines a country
in question appears to play a hand in destabilizing the Congo.87
Non-governmental organizations (“NGO”) continually pressured
officials to enact legislation to address the conflict in the Congo.88
Many NGOs believed that by raising awareness of the connection
between mineral mining, consumer electronic products, and the
ongoing violence in the Congo, it would give rise to socially
responsible investors and companies.89 Because the 2006 Congo Act
did not center on the conflict surrounding the Congo mineral trade,
legislators in Congress pushed for legislation that specifically
addressed this problem.90
In 2009, former Kansas Senator Sam Brownback introduced the
Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 (“Brownback Bill”).91 The
Brownback Bill proposed that the SEC amend Section 13 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) to require
companies whose products may contain Conflict Minerals to publicly
disclose this information.92 In a section entitled “Sense of Congress
on Assistance for Affected Communities,” the Brownback Bill also
called for increased assistance to the Congolese affected by the
conflict–medical treatment, humanitarian relief, rehabilitation
services, and psychological assistance.93 This bill suggested that
87. See 2006 Congo Act, supra note 84; see also Rosen, supra note 86.
88. Narine, supra note 3, at 384 (discussing the advocacy of NGOs regarding conflict
mineral legislation).
89. See id.
90. See 2006 Congo Act, supra note 84; Narine, supra note 3, at 384 (discussing the
advocacy of NGOs regarding conflict mineral legislation).
91. See Congo Conflict Minerals Act, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter
Brownback Bill]; see also Narine, supra note 3. Samuel Brownback served as a US senator for
two terms (1996-2011). He is now governor of the state of Kansas. See Governor Sam
Brownback, KAN. OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, http://www.governor.ks.gov/about-theoffice/governor-sam-brownback (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016).
92. Narine, supra note 3. The Exchange Act is US legislation that gives the SEC the
power to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing agencies
as well as the nation’s securities self-regulatory organizations (SROs). See The Laws That
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
Govern
the
Securities
Industry,
U.S.
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934.
93. The Brownback Bill specifically lists solutions as: “(1) to provide medical treatment,
psychological support, and rehabilitation assistance for survivors of sexual and gender-based
violence; (2) to provide humanitarian relief and basic services to people displaced by violence;
(3) to improve living conditions and livelihood prospects for artisanal miners and mine
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Congress task the United States Agency for International
Development (“USAID”) with expanding its programs to help
Congolese communities adversely affected by the mineral trade.94
Additionally, the Brownback Bill suggested that Congress work with
other countries to: (1) increase protection and services for
communities in the eastern Congo at risk of human rights violations
associated with the mineral trade, particularly women and girls; (2)
strengthen the management and trade of natural resources in the
Congo; and (3) improve conditions and livelihood prospects of miners
and mine workers.95 Though the Brownback Bill garnered some
support, including that of then-Senator Hillary Clinton who believed
there was connection with mineral mining and human rights abuse,
the Brownback Bill did not pass.96
Later in 2009, Congressman Jim McDermott introduced the
Conflict Minerals Trade Act (“McDermott Bill”).97 Upon returning to
central Africa in 2007 after serving as a medical officer over twenty
years prior, McDermott was shocked by the overwhelming presence
of human rights abuses in the Congo.98 Similar to the Brownback Bill,
the McDermott Bill aimed to address human rights abuses associated
with the Congolese mineral trade.99 The McDermott Bill also outlined
similar solutions to the human rights abuses with a section entitled
“Sense of Congress on Assistance for Affected Communities,”
tasking USAID with expanding their programs and calling on to
Congress to work with other countries to achieve these ends.100 One
workers; and (4) to alleviate poverty by reconstructing infra-structure and revitalizing
agricultural production.” Brownback Bill, supra note 91.
94. Brownback Bill, supra note 91.
95. Id.
96. Narine, supra note 3, at 386. Secretary Clinton was senator for the State of New
York, US 67th Secretary of State, and 2016 US Presidential Nominee for the Democratic
Party. See Hillary Clinton Biography, http://www.biography.com/people/hillary-clinton9251306 (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016).
97. Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong., 1st Session (2009) [hereinafter
McDermott Bill].
98. Ben Protess, Dodd-Frank Strays Far From Street, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2011),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE4DA153DF937A25754C0A9679D8B6
3.
99. See Brownback Bill, supra note 91 (discussing the promotion of peace and security
within the Congo and solutions to eradicate the conflict); see also McDermott Bill, supra note
97 (discussing the promotion of peace and security within the Congo and solutions to eradicate
the conflict).
100. McDermott Bill, supra note 97.
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difference between the Brownback Bill and the McDermott Bill
regarding assistance measures is that the McDermott Bill also
specifically focused on child labor and alleviating its negative effects,
while the Brownback Bill did not.101 Also, unlike the Brownback Bill,
there were no SEC disclosure requirements in McDermott’s Conflict
Minerals legislation.102 Rather than amending the Exchange Act, the
McDermott Bill sought to prohibit the import of certain products
containing Conflict Minerals, and imposed penalties under Section
592 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (“Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act”).103
Various NGOs supported the McDermott Bill, but ultimately it did
not pass.104
2. SEC: US Congress’ Agency of Choice for Disclosure
Ultimately, the SEC was tasked with enforcing the United
States’ Conflict Minerals regulation.105 The SEC maintains that its
mandate or mission is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”106 The US
Supreme Court noted it has repeatedly declared that the fundamental
purpose of the Exchange Act is to implement a philosophy of full
disclosure.107 Moreover, Congress has also stated that honest markets
cannot exist without honest publicity, and that manipulation and
dishonest practices in the market flourish on mystery and secrecy.108
Disclosure of material company information is considered important
from the reasonable investor’s perspective.109 What is material to a
reasonable investor depends upon the significance that the reasonable

101. Id.
102. McDermott Bill, supra note 97; Brownback Bill, supra note 91.
103. H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009).
104. Narine, supra note 3, at 387 (discussing the advocacy of NGOs regarding conflict
mineral legislation).
105. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at §VI(I)(A).
106. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016) [hereinafter SEC, What We Do] (describing the
Agency’s objectives and what the Agency does to achieve these objectives).
107. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (“Underlying the adoption of
extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy: ‘There cannot be honest
markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place
thrive upon mystery and secrecy.’”)
108. Id.
109. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented
information.110
In the Final Rule promulgated pursuant to Section 1502 and
Section 13(p) of the Exchange Act, the SEC briefly explains why
Congress chose its office as the ultimate enforcer for Conflict Mineral
regulation to curb the Congo mineral trade.111 Congress aimed to
mitigate the armed conflict associated with the mineral trade and
believed Conflict Minerals disclosure use may reduce funding for
armed groups fighting over mineral mines.112 Congress had hoped,
ultimately, that this type of disclosure would diminish and eventually
eradicate the conflict in the Congo.113 One of the co-sponsors for
Section 1502 noted that such a provision would enhance transparency
and help American consumers and investors inform their decisions
when doing business with companies that may use Conflict
Minerals.114
3. Possible Alternatives to the SEC
Some parties have argued that expanding the SEC’s duties
beyond its congressional mandate may cause more harm than good,
especially in the arena of foreign policy.115 As mentioned, the SEC is
largely tasked with work involving disclosure within the financial
sector and enforcement of laws preventing financial abuse.116 Those
who are against tasking the SEC with enforcement duties outside of
110. Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 (stating “[a]s we clarify today materiality depends on the
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented
information”) It has also been noted that the SEC’s “spin” on this materiality standard focuses
on matters that “have affected, or will affect, a company’s profitability and financial outlook.”
Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1433, 1434 (2002).
111. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Karen E. Woody, Securities Laws as Foreign Policy, 15 NEV. L.J. 297, 301-02
(2014) (discussing the disadvantages of tasking the SEC with work outside of its expertise);
Veale, supra note 14, at 527 (discussing why the SEC should not be a vehicle for promoting of
social and foreign policy goals). See also Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure
Requirements?, supra note 110 (“As such, some have criticized the SEC for making an
“awkward lurch into foreign policy” and forgetting that “[its] role is not to advise investors
about what would be good for them - let alone the United States - but simply to insist that
companies disclose all material facts about their activities.”)
116. See SEC, What We Do, supra note 106; Woody, supra note 115.
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the financial industry believe that both the SEC and financial
investors are at risk for harm, and that it is likely the SEC will not
have sufficient resources or time to work towards the goals for which
it was actually created.117 For these reasons, the following discussion
focuses on several suggested alternatives to combating the conflict
associated with the mineral trade in the Congo.118 Moreover, agencies
mentioned in both the Brownback Bill and the McDermott Bill are
examined as possible alternatives to the SEC.
Because of the existing procedures of using the US Customs and
Border Protection (“Customs”) to inspect conflicted resources like
blood diamonds, it has been argued that Customs should be tasked
with the inspection of other conflict resources, like minerals.119
Customs reviews all diamond import documentation, flags rough
diamonds for review, and enters shipment information into a
database.120 One of the primary missions of Customs is to “enhanc[e]
the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate
trade.”121 Through Customs, Congress may have an opportunity to
address the Conflict Minerals problem instead of expanding the
SEC’s mandate to address an issue the SEC “lacks precedence in
confronting or capacity to handle effectively.”122
It has also been suggested that using Tax Codes to address the
Conflict Minerals problem may be a better fit than tasking the SEC
with solving this issue.123 First, this proposal suggests to fully ban
sourcing Conflict Minerals, and calls for a universally accepted
117. See Woody, supra note 115, at 301 (stating that the SEC and financial investors are
losing out in two ways: “(1) by losing the opportunity that the proper agency (i.e., one with the
particular expertise and resources) and its experts would achieve the goal in a more efficient
and more successful way; and (2) by reducing the ability of the mis-tasked agency to do its
best with the proper tasks it should be accomplishing”).
118. See Feinzeig, supra note 8 (discussing Tax Codes as an alternative); see also Veale,
supra note 14, at 520 (discussing Customs as an alternative to detecting Conflict Minerals in
products).
119. See Raj, supra note 2. Blood diamonds are rough, uncut diamonds sold to fund the
brutal civil wars of Angola and Sierra Leone. See Aryn Barker, Blood Diamonds, TIME (Aug.
2015), http://time.com/blood-diamonds/.
120. See US Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-978, Conflict Diamonds:
Agency Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of the Clean Diamond Trade Act 2 (2006),
at 18, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06978.pdf; see also Raj, supra note 2, at 1000.
121. About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, www.cbp.gov/about (last
accessed Oct. 18, 2016).
122. Raj, supra note 2, at 1021.
123. See Feinzeig, supra note 8 (discussing Tax Codes as an alternative).
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certification system, similar to the type that Customs uses to root out
blood diamonds coming into the United States.124 Next, this proposal
suggests providing tax benefits to companies that purchase conflictfree minerals.125 These tax benefits would be similar to those given to
taxpayers who buy a home for a first time, or rely on person and
dependency exemptions.126 The proposal recognizes such
incentivizing methods may not have been appropriate in prior
years.127 However, it has been noted that the US Congress has
transformed the Tax Code as a means to implement government
policy and social reform.128 Other examples include the Earned
Income Tax Credit, empowerment-zone credit, and child-care
credit.129
One US agency that has been seemingly overlooked to resolve
the Conflict Minerals problem is USAID, as both the Brownback Bill
and the McDermott Bill had suggested.130 USAID works to end
extreme global poverty and empower various nations and
communities in need to realize their potential.131 The core of
USAID’s mission is its commitment to work as partners with these
nations and communities to promote sustainable development.132
USAID strives for empowerment and support through collaboration,
rather than strong imposition.133 Before providing assistance to a
certain country, USAID employs a Conflict Assessment Framework,
which is a systematic process that analyzes and prioritizes the

124. Id. at 983.
125. Id. at 986.
126. Id. at 986.
127. Id.
128. See Feinzeig, supra note 8 (discussing Tax Codes as an alternative); Susannah
Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of U.S.
Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. LEGIS. 67, 68 (2013) (discussing the social policy benefits of using
Tax Codes through the Internal Revenue Service “IRS” to benefit potentially marginalized
groups).
129. See Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 986.
130. See Brownback Bill, supra note 91, at §6(a) (discussing Sense of Congress on
Assistance for the Congo through USAID); see also McDermott Bill, supra note 97, at §5(a),
(discussing Sense of Congress on Assistance for the Congo through USAID).
131. Who We Are, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are (last accessed Oct. 18,
2016).
132. Mission, Vision, Values, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/missionvision-values (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016).
133. See id.
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dynamics of peace, conflict, stability, and instability.134 This
assessment helps USAID with strategies, developing policies, and
programs to effectively prevent, mitigate, and manage conflict
dynamics in a given country.135
Most notably, USAID has provided the Congo with assistance
since the country’s independence.136 To date, USAID and the Office
of US Foreign Disaster Assistance provided US$38 million in
humanitarian assistance for the Congo.137 This assistance was in
response to the Congo’s population displacement, yellow fever
outbreak, deteriorating road conditions, and other complex
emergencies.138
4. Current US Conflict Minerals Legislation and Regulation
The Dodd-Frank Act was passed with a number of “sleeper
provisions” that went undetected by most investors, one of them
being Section 1502.139 Just as the Brownback Bill had suggested in
2009, Section 1502 amended Section 13 of the Exchange Act.140
Labeled as the “name-and-shame” law, Section 1502 does not outlaw
the sourcing of minerals from the Congo, but rather “aims to provide
transparency to consumers and investors so that they can make
informed choices about the companies with which they choose to do
business.”141 Section 1502 tasked the SEC with promulgating rules
requiring issuing companies to disclose whether their product
contains or may contain Conflict Minerals originally from the

134.
Conflict Assessment Framework: Assessment Grade, USAID (2002),
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf.
135. Id.
136. DRC History, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/history
(last accessed Oct. 18, 2016).
137. DRC – Complex Emergency, USAID (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/1866/drc_ce_fs03_08-02-2016.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Narine, supra note 3, at 388. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act to address
financial regulatory reform in 2010 in response to the financial crisis beginning in 2008.
Narine, supra note 3, at 387. “Sleeper provisions” are defined as provisions which garner little
congressional or public attention at the time of enactment, but have a significant impact after
enactment. Madeline June Kass, A Least Bad Approach For Interpreting ESA Stealth
Provision, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 427 (2008).
140. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13.
141. Narine, supra note 3, at 351.
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Congo.142 Section 1502 amended the Exchange Act by including a
new section, Section 13(p).143
According to the SEC, in enacting the Conflict Minerals
Statutory Provision, Congress intended to support the humanitarian
goal of combating the violent conflict in the Congo, which is funded
in part by the exploitation of the mineral trade by armed groups in the
region.144 When detailing Rule 13p-1’s background, the SEC places
emphasis on ending the emergency humanitarian crisis, stating that
the legislative history surrounding Section 1502 and earlier legislation
reflects Congress’ motivation to further support the end of human
rights abuses linked to the Conflict Minerals trade in the Covered
Countries.145 The SEC refers to the Congo and its adjoining countries
as “Covered Countries.”146 Adjoining countries may refer to Angola,
Burundi, Central African Republic, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda, or Zambia.147
The SEC also notes that parts of Section 1502 convey that
Congress’ intention behind passing this provision was to promote
peace and security.148 Specifically, Section 1502(d)(2)(A) states that
two years after the 2010 enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and
annually after that, the Comptroller General of the United States shall
submit to the relevant congressional committee a report including an
“assessment of the effectiveness” of Section 1502 in promoting peace
and security.149 By enacting Section 1502, the SEC also noted that
Congress intended to reduce funding for the armed groups

142. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 2213-2218 (2010).
143. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13.
144. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § I(A).
145. Id. According to the SEC, “Covered Countries” refers to both the Congo and its
adjoining countries. Section 1502(e)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act defines “adjoining country” as
a country sharing an internationally recognized border with the Congo.
146. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at n.8.
147. Nanda, supra note 23, at 288.
148. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13; Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §
1502(d)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 2213-2218 (2010) (stating that two years after enactment of the Act
and annually thereafter, “the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that includes” an “assessment of the
effectiveness” of the Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision “in promoting peace and security”
in the Covered Countries).
149. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at n.13.

2017]

WHO STARVED FOR THAT SMARTPHONE?

605

contributing to the strife in the Congo, thus “put[ting] pressure on
such groups to end the conflict.”150
The SEC announced the release of Rule 13p-1 and Form SD to
implement Section 13(p), effective November 13, 2012.151 To
streamline the disclosure process, the SEC provided a three-step plan
to ensure proper compliance with due diligence and disclosure
requirements for Rule 13p-1 and Form SD.152 The first step involves
determining who must comply with Section 1502.153 This step is
satisfied if a company (1) is an issuer that files reports with the
Commission under Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange
Act and (2) manufactures products containing Conflict Minerals
necessary for the product’s main functions or necessary for the
production of this product, or alternatively, contracts to manufacture
such products.154 If both conditions are met, a company should move
on to the next step.155
The second step of proper compliance requires completing a
reasonable country of origin inquiry.156 The SEC does not provide
detailed guidance regarding the completion of this inquiry.157 As long
as the inquiry is made in good faith and reasonably designed to
determine whether any of the Conflict Minerals originated in the
Covered Countries or are from recycled or scrap sources, the
reasonable country of origin inquiry requirement is satisfied.158 After
making a reasonable country of origin inquiry, issuers may not need
to proceed with the final step of this plan.159 Rather, their disclosure
obligations may be limited to specific items on the SEC’s new Form
150. Id. at § I(A); Narine, supra note 3, at 388.
151. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § V(A).
152. McKay S. Harline, Can we Make Them Obey? U.S. Reporting Companies, Their
Foreign Suppliers, and the Conflict Minerals Disclosure Requirements of Dodd-Frank, 35
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 439, 444 (2015).
153. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § II(B); see also Harline, supra note 152.
154. The SEC lists domestic companies, foreign private issuers, and smaller reporting
companies as issuers that are subject to this provision. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13,
at § II(B)(1)(c); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(p)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934).
155. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § II(B); see also Harline, supra note 152,
at 444 (discussing the SEC’s Conflict Mineral regulation requirements).
156. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § II(B); see also Harline, supra note
152, at 444 (discussing the SEC’s Conflict Mineral regulation requirements).
157. Harline, supra note 152, at 445.
158. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § II(D).
159. Id; see also Harline, supra note 152, at 446 (discussing the SEC’s Conflict Mineral
regulation requirements).
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SD.160 If, however, a company determines that the Conflict Minerals
may have originated from one of the Covered Countries, then the
issuer must move to the third and final step.161
During this final step, an issuer must submit a report describing
what measures the issuer has taken to exercise due diligence on the
minerals’ source chain of custody if an issuer’s products contained
Conflict Minerals originating from the Covered Countries.162 Instead
of simply filing a Form SD, companies whose products may contain
Conflict Minerals from the Covered Countries would also need to file
a much more detailed report, known as the “Conflict Minerals
Report.”163 Issuers are required to exercise due diligence regarding
the source and chain of custody of the Conflict Minerals in their
products.164 The SEC recommends that issuers follow a nationally or
internationally recognized due diligence framework.165 The SEC
recognizes the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk
Areas (“OECD Due Diligence Guidelines”) as an international
framework for mineral supply chain disclosure and bases much of
their Rule on these guidelines.166 The Conflict Minerals Report must
also include an independent private sector auditor report as well as a
description of products that have not found to be “DRC Conflict
Free” or “DRC Conflict Undeterminable.”167
Following the decision in National Association of
Manufacturers, et al. v. SEC, the SEC provided further guidance
regarding compliance with Rule 13p-1 and Form SD.168 The SEC no
longer requires companies to describe its products as “DRC conflict
free,” “having not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’” or “DRC
160. See Harline, supra note 152, at 446 (discussing the SEC’s Conflict Mineral
regulation requirements).
161. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § II(D).
162. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(p)(1)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934).
163. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § II(E).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Keith F.
Higgins, Statement on the Effect of the Recent Court of Appeals Decision on the Conflict
Minerals Rule, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/
News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541681994.
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conflict undeterminable” in its Conflict Minerals Report on their
website.169 For products that are not described as conflict free,
companies must disclose smelter and/or refiners that processed the
minerals, the country or origin (if known), and their efforts to
determine the mine or location of origin of these minerals.170
5. Section 1502’s Effects on the Congo
In 2009, the Congo’s mineral wealth was estimated to total
US$24 trillion.171 Today, the estimated value of the Congo’s mineral
wealth remains the same, with the conflict in the Congo continuing.172
Mining and extraction make up about twenty-two percent of the
Congo’s GDP.173 Since Section 1502 has been implemented, there is
an ongoing debate whether the Rule has served its purpose in
combating the conflict associated with mineral mining in the
Congo.174 Those who consider Conflict Mineral regulation to be
effective in following its objectives note that prior to Section 1502’s
passage, few companies made the extra effort to audit the source of
the minerals in their products.175 Supporters of Conflict Minerals
regulation also note the significant improvements in the transparency
of corporate supply chains, and though there are still active Conflict
Mineral mines present in the Congo, supporters noted a decrease in
the number of these mines in the Congo.176 They also believe that
Conflict Minerals provision has created a “strong market incentive”

169. See Higgins, supra note 168.
170. Dynda A. Thomas, SEC Conflict Minerals Rule Legal Challenge is Over – But Not
for Good, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/secconflict-minerals-rule-legal-challenge-over-not-good.
171. M.J. Morgan, DR Congo’s $24 Trillion Fortune, 350 AFR. BUS. 52 (Feb. 2009).
172. Global Conflict Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/
global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo
(last accessed Oct. 18, 2016).
173. Id.
174. See Katherine D. Van Marter, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Unintended
Consequences of the Conflict Minerals Rule, 24 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 302-04 (2015)
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of Section 1502).
175. Id. at 302 (discussing companies who implemented industry-wide auditing systems
prior to the enactment of Section 1502).
176. Dodd-Frank 1502 Law: Impact on Conflict Minerals Trade in Congo, ENOUGH
PROJECT (Sept. 22, 2015), www.enoughproject.org/news/dodd-frank-1502-law-impactconflict-minerals-trade-congo.
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by reducing the market for non-traceable minerals.177 The shrinking
of this market occurred as a consequence of the decrease in pricing
for minerals not certified as “conflict-free.”178 The pricing for
minerals not certified as “conflict-free” ranges between thirty and
sixty percent less than minerals that are certified through sourcing
programs.179 The differential in pricing has made the trade in 3T+G
minerals less attractive for some armed groups fueling the conflict in
the Congo.180
Additionally, Bisie, one of the world’s largest and most
profitable tin mines is now largely demilitarized.181 Bisie generated
hundreds of millions of dollars for armed groups responsible for the
conflict in the Congo.182 It has also been reported that over sixty
percent of the tantalum mines in Rubaya, Rwanda (one of the
Covered Countries) are conflict-free. Bosco “Terminator” Ntaganda,
a prominent warlord who previously derived major revenue from
these tantalum mines has surrendered to the International Criminal
Court.183
In 2014, the International Peace Information Service found that
seventy percent of Conflict Mineral mines surveyed across the
Eastern Congo were no longer controlled by armed forces.184 The
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region now runs an
emerging certification mechanism, validating numerous mines in the
Congo as conflict-free.185 As of June 21, 2015, 141 mines in the
Congo were validated as conflict-free by teams comprised of UN

177. Nicholas Webb et al., Conflict Minerals & the Law, 72 BENCH & B. MINN. 26
(2012).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Dodd-Frank 1502 Law: Impact on Conflict Minerals Trade in Congo, supra
note 176.
181. Fidel Bafilemba et al., The Impact of Dodd-Frank and Conflict Minerals Reforms
PROJECT
(June
2014),
on
Eastern
Congo’s
Conflict,
ENOUGH
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Enough%20Project%20%20The%20Impact%20of%20DoddFrank%20and%20Conflict%20Minerals%20Reforms%20on%20Eastern%20Congo%E2%80
%99s%20Conflict%2010June2014.pdf.
182. Dodd-Frank 1502 Law: Impact on Conflict Minerals Trade in Congo, supra note
176.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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officials and Congolese civil society, business, and government
representatives.186
While many support Conflict Minerals regulation and its
objectives for the Congo, its adjoining countries, and Conflict Mineral
mining, there have also been many critics who argue that the Conflict
Minerals provision causes more harm than good.187 In September
2014, seventy academics, researchers, journalists, and advocates
published an open letter criticizing Section 1502, arguing that the
provision “fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between
minerals and conflict,” that internal UN assessments show that eight
percent of the Congo’s conflicts are linked to mineral mining, and that
specific motivations for the conflict differ across the various armed
groups within the region.188
Critics also note the adverse effects of the law on the Congolese
miners themselves.189 Malaysia Smelting, a company known as one of
the world’s largest producers of tin, stopped purchasing minerals from
the Congo entirely.190 Similar to other companies in Malaysia
Smelting’s position, Malaysia Smelting feared being seen as a
Conflict Minerals user, and did not believe it could determine which
minerals were conflict-free, leading to their halt in mineral purchases
from the Congo.191 In 2012, it had been estimated that between five
and twelve million Congolese civilians were inadvertently and
directly negatively affected by Section 1502.192 Before Dodd-Frank
passed, miners sold a kilogram of tin for about US$7, but now miners
only get about US$4 for a kilogram of tin despite the global market
price averaging at about US$22 per kilogram in 2015.193 Because

186. Id.
187. See Van Marter, supra note 174, at 302-04 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of Section 1502).
188. Lauren Wolfe, How Dodd-Frank is Failing the Congo, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 2,
2015), foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/02/how-dodd-frank-is-failing-congo-mining-conflict-min
erals/.
189. See id.; Laura E. Seay, What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV.,
1502 (Jan. 2012), http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1425843
_file_Seay_Dodd_
Frank_FINAL.pdf (discussing weaknesses of Section 1502 and its effects).
190. Wolfe, supra note 188.
191. Id.
192. Seay, supra note 189.
193. Sudarsan Raghavan, How a well-intentioned U.S. law left Congolese miners jobless,
WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/how-a-well-
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many Congolese depend on the money they receive as miners to
support their livelihoods, the miners who are out of work often cannot
feed their families or afford medical treatment.194 Moreover, the lack
of earnings for these miners seemingly produces a domino effect on
their village’s economy.195 Without earning a living, many local
markets, shopkeepers, and seamstresses are also earning significantly
less.196
Lack of transparency is also a significant issue in the due
diligence efforts required by Section 1502.197 There have been cases
of mining officials selling certification tags at US$20, which are then
used to label “dirty” tin as “conflict-free.”198 Mine officials only earn
about US$60 a month, so they are considered “easy to bribe.”199
Emmanuel Ndimubanzi, the head of North Kivu’s mining division
recently stated that there were no mines tagging the output of their
minerals, so buyers had no way of identifying the minerals’ origins.200
The lack of tagging runs counter to Section 1502’s objective of
certification of the minerals’ origins.201
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S APPROACH: IN-PROGRESS
Reacting to the steps the United States took in combating the
conflict associated with the mineral trade, the European Union
decided to embark on similar regulation of its own. First, this Part
reviews how the European Union planned to address the Conflict
Minerals issue from their end. Next, this Part reviews the European

intentioned-us-law-left-congolese-miners-jobless/2014/11/30/14b5924e-69d3-11e4-9fb4a622dae742a2_story.html.
194. Seay, supra note 189, at 15.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Wolfe, supra note 188.
198. Id.
199. Making Congolese Tin ‘Conflict-Free’, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 4, 2014),
http://www.dw.com/en/making-congolese-tin-conflict-free/g-17550932. Tags are part of the
“bag-and-tag” system used in certification systems throughout the Congo to tag which
minerals are “conflict-free.” See Aaron Hall and Sasha Lezhnev, Coming Clean: A Proposal
for Getting Conflict Minerals Certification on Track, ENOUGH PROJECT (Nov. 2013) at 1-2.
200. Tom Burgis, Dodd-Frank’s Misadventures in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, POLITICO MAG. (May 10, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2015/05/dodd-frank-democratic-republic-of-congo-117583.
201. See supra Section II.A.5.
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Union’s proposed Conflict Minerals regulation, and briefly describes
the European Commission’s efforts in aiding the Congo.
A. The European Union’s Response to the United States’ Conflict
Minerals Legislation
In October 2010, soon after Dodd-Frank’s passage, the European
Parliament (“Parliament”) passed a resolution calling upon the
European Union to draft similar legislation to Section 1502.202 The
following year, the European Commission (“Commission”) then
announced its intention to improve transparency in the minerals
supply chain and aspects of due diligence.203 The European Union had
been actively involved in an OECD initiative to address the Conflict
Minerals problem.204 This initiative resulted in the OECD Due
Diligence Guidelines, which provided a due diligence measures
framework for companies whose products may contain Conflict
Minerals.205 Like the United States, the European Union recognizes
the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines as an international framework
for disclosure of the use of Conflict Minerals.206
Between March and June 2013, the European Union embarked
on a public consultation to obtain interested parties’ views on a
potential EU initiative for responsible sourcing of minerals coming
from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.”207 The European Union
then undertook further in-depth consultations and an impact
assessment of the possible enactment of Conflict Minerals
regulation.208 The following year, the Parliament’s development
committee produced a report on promoting development through
responsible business practices, specifically examining the role of
202. European Commission, EU Draft Regulation, 2014/0059 (2014), [hereinafter
Commission Draft Regulation].
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id. at 2
205. Id.
206. Id; see OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 16.
207. The European Union consulted stakeholders or people concerned by the topic of the
consultation. Public consultation on a possible EU initiative on responsible sourcing of
minerals originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/?consul_id=174.
208. Proposed EU regulation on conflict minerals: commentaries & media coverage,
BUS. & HUM. RTS. CTR., https://business-humanrights.org/en/conflict-peace/conflictminerals/proposed-eu-regulation-on-conflict-minerals-commentaries-media-coverage
(last
accessed Oct. 10, 2016).
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extractive industries in developing countries.209 The report stressed
the need for an European Union regulation that required companies
using minerals and other resources originating from conflict-affected
areas to perform due diligence in accordance with the OECD Due
Diligence Guidelines.210 The Parliament also suggested in its report
that draft Conflict Minerals regulation “be comparable with the
obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act, so that when fulfilling
European Union obligations on responsible sourcing companies
automatically fulfill the obligations under United States
legislation.”211
B. The European Commission’s Proposed Conflict Minerals
Legislation
The Commission is the European Union’s politically
independent executive arm, solely responsible for drafting European
legislation proposals and implementing the decisions of Parliament
and the Council of the European Union.212 In March 2014, the
Commission released a draft regulation establishing a selfcertification system for importers of Conflict Minerals and other
metals.213 The proposed regulation establishes a system for supply
chain due diligence self-certification intended to fight the conflict
associated with the mineral trade in affected countries.214
According to the Commission, the regulation is designed to
“curtail opportunities for armed groups and security forces to trade in
tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold” and provide
“transparency and certainty as regards [to] the supply practices of
importers, smelters and refiners sourcing from conflict-affected and

209. Report on promoting development through responsible business practices,
specifically the role of extractive industries in developing countries, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
(Feb. 19, 2014), www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML
+REPORT+A7-2014-0132+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN, at 13.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. European Union, European Commission, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abouteu/institutions-bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm (last accessed Oct. 11, 2016).
213. Press Release, European Commission, EU proposes responsible trading strategy for
minerals from conflict zones (Mar. 5 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14218_en.htm.
214. Commission Draft Regulation supra note 202, at 4.
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high-risk areas.”215 Unlike Section 1502, this proposed regulation is a
voluntary framework for companies in the European Union who
choose to be self-certified as “responsible importers.”216
The proposed regulation mandates that the responsible importer
of minerals or metals must clearly communicate to suppliers and the
public its supply chain policy for the minerals and metals potentially
sourced from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.217 Responsible
importers are also expected to model its supply chain policy standards
against the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines.218 The proposed
regulation requires the responsible importer to structure its internal
management system to maintain supply chain due diligence by
assigning responsibility to senior staff to supervise this process, and
maintain records for at least five years.219 Moreover, the responsible
importer is also expected to operate a “chain of custody” system to
trace the origins of the minerals through the supply chain.220 This
chain of custody system must be supported by documentation
describing the mineral, name and address of its supplier, country of
origin, quantities, and if it is determined that the minerals did come
from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, the mine of mineral origin,
locations where the mineral was traded, and processed and taxes and
fees paid.221
The responsible importer is also required to identify and assess
the risks in its mineral supply chain and take the necessary steps to
prevent and/or mitigate these risks.222 The proposed regulation
imposes third-party obligations on the responsible importer, requiring
the responsible importer to perform audits through independent thirdparty audits similar to requirements under Section 1502.223 The
215. Id. at 4. The Commission also states “this Regulation . . . is designed to provide
transparency and certainty as regards the supply practices of importers, smelters and refiners
sourcing from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.”
216. Id. at 5. The Commission defines “responsible importer” as one who “chooses to
self-certify according to the rules set out in this Regulation” and “self-certification” as “the act
of declaring one’s adherence to the obligations relating to management systems, risk
management, third-party audits and disclosure as set out in this Regulation.”
217. Id. at Art. 4(a) and 4(b).
218. Id. at Art. 4(b).
219. Id. at Art. 4(c).
220. Id. at Art. 4(f).
221. Id.
222. Id. at Art. 5.
223. Id. at Art. 6.
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independent third-party audits must include an audit of the importer’s
activities, processes, and systems used to implement the mineral
supply chain due diligence policies.224
By March 31st of each year, responsible importers are expected
to submit to the relevant Member State documentation certifying
conformity with the obligations provided by the proposed regulation,
independent-third party audit reports, and disclosure of information
learned about the origin of minerals used during the previous year,
“publicly report[ing] as widely as possible, including on the internet
and on an annual basis on its supply chain due diligence policies and
practices for responsible sourcing.”225
C. The European Union’s Path to Implementing Conflict Minerals
Legislation
Soon after the Commission released its proposed Conflict
Minerals regulation, critics were quick to note its weaknesses and
inevitable ineffectiveness to prevent financing of conflict in the
Congo and other affected countries.226 Sophia Pickles, a
spokeswoman for the campaigning group Global Witness stated that
because of the proposed regulation’s voluntary nature, the proposal is
“tantamount to the EU saying that it’s ok for companies to choose not
to behave responsibly,” undermining the duty to “protect human
rights, which is well-established under international law.”227
Moreover, Pickles noted that there is already a voluntary due
diligence framework in place–the OECD Due Diligence
Guidelines.228
Many critics believed that the Commission’s proposed
regulation would fail to put the European Union at the same level of

224. Id.
225. Id. at Art. 7.
226. See Press Release, Global Witness, Proposed EU Law Will Not Keep Conflict
Resources
Out
of
Europe,
Campaigners
Warn
(Mar.
5,
2014),
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/proposed-eu-law-will-not-keep-conflict-resourcesout-europe-campaigners-warn/ [hereinafter Global Witness Press Release]; Arthur Nelsen, EU
drafts conflict minerals law, with opt-in clause, EURACTIV (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/eu-drafts-conflict-minerals-lawwith-opt-in-clause/.
227. Global Witness Press Release, supra note 226.
228. Id.
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responsible sourcing standards as their US competitors.229 Instead of
raising the bar on responsible sourcing standards, critics argue that a
voluntary due diligence scheme to track the origin of minerals may
threaten international standards and weaken the objectives for
responsible mineral sourcing.230 Many also contend that by limiting
the proposed regulation to importers of these minerals, the
Commission has failed to influence the behavior of companies that
market and import finished products possibly containing Conflict
Minerals.231 Companies that would be affected by the Commission’s
proposed regulation would be those placing raw minerals on the
market (i.e., smelters), and not include companies who import
assembled products like cellular phones, which may already contain
Conflict Minerals.232
In 2015, a year after the Commission’s release of its proposed
Conflict Minerals regulation, Parliament voted in favor of a
mandatory certification system for importers of Conflict Minerals and
manufacturers of products that may contain Conflict Minerals.233
Lawmakers in the Parliament proposed last minute amendments
calling for a mandatory monitoring system from conflict-affected
areas like the Congo, Colombia and Afghanistan.234 The amendments
passed by a vote of 378 to 300, with eleven abstentions.235
In June 2016, EU lawmakers, Member States and the
Commission provisionally agreed upon a proposed Conflict Minerals
regulation and planned to formally adopt these regulations within the

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Nelsen, supra note 226.
233. Dynda A. Thomas & Kate Stokes, European Parliament Votes In Favor of
Mandatory Certification System for Importers of Conflict Minerals and Disclosure by
Downstream Companies Certification System for Importers of Conflict Minerals and
Disclosure by Downstream Companies, CONFLICT MINERALS LAW (June 12, 2015),
www.conflictmineralslaw.com/2015/06/12/european-parliament-votes-in-favor-of-mandatorycertification-system-for-importers-of-conflict-minerals-and-disclosure-by-downstreamcompanies/.
234. Cécile Barbière, Parliament Votes For Tougher Conflict Minerals Regulation,
EURACTIV.FR (May 21, 2015), www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/
parliament-votes-for-tougher-conflict-minerals-regulation/.
235. Id.
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coming months.236 Currently, there are no new drafts available,
however it has been reported that the European Union plans to
implement mandatory due diligence procedures, requiring disclosure
for direct importers of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk
areas.237 A distinction between this provisionally agreed-upon
regulation and the United States’ is that the European Union’s
regulation would cover all conflict regions worldwide, and is not
limited to the Congo and its adjacent countries.238 Smaller businesses,
such as dentistry practices, that trade in minerals would be exempt
from this due diligence and disclosure requirement.239 Electronics
manufacturers would not have a due diligence obligation, but would
be asked to voluntarily disclose the details of their mineral
sourcing.240
D. The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil
Protection
Unlike the United States, it is not entirely clear which EU
agency would enforce their regulation, and thus there have not been
many suggested agency alternatives.241 There is, however, an agency

236. Joseph Ataman, EU Agrees on Measures Regulating Conflict Minerals, WALL ST.
J. (June 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-agrees-on-measures-regulating-conflictminerals-1466103065.
237. Jen De Ruyt et al., Agreement in Principle Announced for EU Regime on Conflict
Minerals, NAT. L. REV. (June 27, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/agreementprinciple-announced-eu-regime-conflict-minerals.
238. Stephen Gardner, EU Provisionally Agrees on Conflict Minerals Law, BLOOMBERG
BNA (June 16, 2016), http://www.bna.com/eu-provisionally-agrees-n57982074302/.
239. Martin Banks, Conflict minerals: EU accused of prioritising profit over people,
PARLIAMENT MAG. (June 23, 2016), https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/
news/conflict-minerals-eu-accused-prioritising-profit-over-people.
240. At a briefing in Parliament, Nele Meyer of Amnesty International, stated, “The
decision leaves companies that import minerals in their products entirely off the hook. It’s a
half-hearted attempt to tackle the trade in conflict minerals which will only hold companies
importing the raw materials to basic checks.” Iverna McGowan, head of Amnesty
International’s European institutions office, added, “The EU has international obligations to
protect human rights but went only half way to meet them. EU investors and consumers still
won’t have any certainty that the companies they deal with are behaving responsibly. This law
will change little too little.” Banks, supra note 239.
241. See Commission Draft Regulation, supra note 202 (“Any importer of minerals or
metals within the scope of the Regulation may self- certify as responsible importer by
declaring to a Member State competent authority that it adheres to the supply chain due
diligence obligations set out in this Regulation.”)
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in the European Union with similar duties to USAID.242 The
European Commission has an office dedicated to providing countries
in need with humanitarian aid and relief, though the office does not
directly address how Conflict Minerals play a role in the Congolese
humanitarian crisis.243 The Directorate-General for European Civil
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (“ECHO”) is
responsible for ensuring rapid and effective delivery of EU relief
assistance through humanitarian aid and civil protection.244 ECHO
recognizes that the Congolese humanitarian crisis is both complex
and long-standing.245 ECHO acknowledges that the crisis stems from
constant fighting in the Congo, leading to the displacement of
Congolese individuals, looting and violent acts like rape, kidnapping,
and forced child labor.246 ECHO provides the Congo with shelter,
water, food, sanitation facilities, and medical services to the displaced
Congolese and responding to the needs of returning refugees.247
ECHO faces problems with accessing remote parts of the Congo to
provide help because of poor infrastructure and lack of security.248
The Commission operates a dedicated humanitarian air service called
“ECHO Flight” and helicopters, which transport humanitarian
personnel and supplies to remote areas in the Congo where access by
road is impossible or unsafe.249
IV. IMPROVING UPON SECTION 1502’S SHORTCOMINGS
This Part argues that US Conflict Mineral legislation is not
enough to combat the human rights abuses in the Congo. Here, the
shortcomings of the US Conflict Mineral legislation are discussed.
Additionally, this Part details what the European Union should ideally
improve upon when finalizing their own Conflict Minerals regulation.

242. See About EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/who/about-echo_en (last accessed Oct. 11, 2016).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Democratic Republic of the Congo, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ec.europa.eu/echo/
where/sub-saharan-africa/congo_en (last accessed Oct. 11, 2016).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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A. Do Not Task a Securities Commission with Combating Human
Rights Violations
First, the European Union should focus on which office in its
government is best suited to enforce Conflict Minerals regulation.250
As well-intentioned as the drafters of Section 1502 may have been,
the end result of the provision and the rules that followed may not
have actually helped the Congo and its victims as seamlessly as
advocates convey.251 Although there has been a reduction in active
Conflict Mineral mines in the Congo, the effects of these armed
forces and Section 1502 on the Congolese people themselves require
more attention.252 As a reminder, the SEC’s mission is to “protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation.”253 When thinking about the SEC, the fight against
human rights abuses is presumably not the first topic that surfaces in
one’s mind.254 Rather, the SEC is best known for its work with the
financial sector and enforcement of laws preventing financial
abuse.255
Investors may consider the use of Conflict Minerals as material
information in making investment decisions, since public perception
of the armed conflict could negatively affect a company’s profits.256
Therefore, at the most basic level, it is easy to see why the SEC could
be an appropriate agency for the job.257 It requires the disclosure of
the use of Conflict Minerals in a company’s manufactured products,

250. See De Ruyt et al., supra note 237 and accompanying text (indicating that the
European Union has not chosen a specific agency or office to enforce Conflict Mineral
regulation).
251. See supra Section II.A.5 (discussing Section 1502’s effects on the Congo).
252. See id.
253. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13 (describing the Agency’s objectives and
what the Agency does to achieve these objectives).
254. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (discussing critics of the SEC going
beyond its congressional mandate).
255. See supra note 114 (discussing the SEC’s traditional role as enforcer in the financial
industry).
256. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
materiality in information for investors).
257. See supra Section II.A (discussing the purpose of disclosure and its importance in
the US Conflict Mineral legislation and regulation).
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which is conceivably material information that could adversely affect
an investor’s stake in a company.258
However, the SEC explicitly pointed out that Congress’
intention in passing Section 1502 was to support the “humanitarian
goal” of combating the violent conflict in the Congo, partially
financed by the exploitation of trade minerals by armed groups, and to
“promote peace and security.”259 As an agency whose mission is to
protect investors and facilitate capital formation, the SEC is not as
well-versed in the mineral trade and fighting human rights as other
offices and agencies may be.260 Moreover, it is also interesting to note
that Section 1502 was considered a Dodd-Frank sleeper provision.261
Perhaps its drafters intended for this to be so as congressional or
public attention before enactment might have gutted the provision
altogether.262
Customs may be one agency that could be better equipped to
deal with the Conflict Minerals trade issue.263 As an agency tasked to
root out blood diamonds, it is possible that their blood diamond
inspection procedures could serve as a model when inspecting
products for Conflict Minerals.264 Alternatively, the IRS may also be
the better choice as a deterrent for the use of Conflict Minerals by
various corporations.265 By providing corporations with a tax benefit
for avoiding Conflict Minerals altogether, this benefit could quite
possibly condition many companies to conduct thorough due
diligence before using certain minerals in their products.266
258. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
materiality in information for investors).
259. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13 (discussing Congress’ intention behind
combatting the conflict in the Congo associated with the mineral trade).
260. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (discussing critics of the SEC going
beyond its congressional mandate of financial regulation).
261. See note 139 and accompanying text (describing sleeper provisions).
262. See id. (defining sleeper provisions as provisions that garner little attention before
enactment). Drafters may have intended for Section 1502 to go unnoticed because of its
extensive requirements on corporations who use Conflict Minerals.
263. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. These sources provide alternative
government agencies that may better address the Conflict Minerals problem – i.e. Customs and
the IRS. Because blood diamonds are associated with dangerous conditions much like Conflict
Minerals, perhaps looking to current Customs procedures for detecting blood diamonds can be
used for Conflict Minerals as well.
264. See id.
265. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
266. See id.
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Although both Customs and the IRS may be much better choices
for enforcing Section 1502, both agencies, much like the SEC, are not
traditionally known to deal directly with human rights issues.267 In
conjunction with either Customs or the IRS, USAID may finally
address Congress’ concerns with promoting peace and prosperity in
the Congo.268 Since USAID has already worked closely with the
Congo by providing millions of dollars of humanitarian relief, tasking
USAID to also focus on victims of the Conflict Mineral trade may
better alleviate the adverse effects of the armed conflict and
corporations moving their mineral business elsewhere.269 One
suggestion might be for the USAID to collaborate with the Congolese
to implement a more transparent supply chain.270 Because the USAID
strives for empowerment without imposition, the USAID could help
diminish the conflict in the mineral trade by sending investigators to
examine the tiers of extraction, transport, handling, trading,
processing, smelting, refining, and alloying in the supply chain.271
Once glaring issues such as abusive labor conditions are identified in
the different tiers of the supply chain, USAID investigators can advise
the appropriate government agencies and recommend more funding to
implement a system to eradicate these conditions.272
The SEC’s purpose is to protect investors and facilitate capital
formation.273 Adding the responsibility of overseeing Conflict
Mineral supply chain due diligence may overwhelm an agency that is
likely not experienced enough to meet Congress’ objectives in the
first place.274 Congress has seemingly broadened the SEC’s mission
beyond investor protection and capital formation.275 If Congress will
go so far as to broaden or alter the SEC’s mission, perhaps it should

267. See supra Section II.A.3.
268. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13 (discussing Congress’ intention behind
combatting the conflict in the Congo associated with the mineral trade).
269. See supra Section II.A.3.
270. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
271. See id.
272. See supra Section II.A.3.
273. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13 (describing the Agency’s objectives and
what the Agency does to achieve these objectives).
274. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (discussing critics of the SEC going
beyond its congressional mandate of financial regulation).
275. See id.
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directly address the Conflict Minerals issue rather than burden the
SEC.276
The European Union should avoid tasking a securities
commission with the implementation of Conflict Minerals regulation
as well.277 The European Union may look into creating a special
commission in addressing the Conflict Minerals problem, which
could be a combination of two different agencies working in
tandem.278 The European Union could task their customs agency with
monitoring the source of incoming minerals, which may have similar
procedures in rooting out blood diamonds.279 Another alternative
would be placing more monetary penalties through their tax
agency.280 If the European Union decides to take either route, it
should bear in mind that these offices should work in conjunction
with ECHO.281
B. Human Rights: There is More the European Union Can and
Should Do
Currently, the European Union is still in the process of finalizing
their version of a Conflict Minerals regulation.282 The European
Union can learn a great deal from the United States’ missteps of
tasking a securities commission with a critical human rights issue.283
In light of the European Union’s pending regulation, the Parliament
and the Commission must focus on what should be the real objective
behind Conflict Minerals regulation in any nation: protecting human
rights in conflict-affected countries.284

276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See supra Section II.A.3. These sources are used for comparative purposes,
providing the basis for suggestions in addressing the Conflict Minerals problem and
shortcomings of current procedures tackling this issue.
279. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 237-35 and accompanying text.
282. See notes 232-36 and accompanying text (discussing the forthcoming EU Conflict
Mineral regulation).
283. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
284. See supra Section II.A.4 (discussing Congress’s intention in passing Section 1502:
supporting the “humanitarian goal” of combating the violent conflict in the Congo and to
“promote peace and security.”)
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Even if the European Union’s forthcoming Conflict Minerals
regulation is passed in the near future, reports have indicated it still
does not adequately address the humanitarian aspect of this Note’s
argument.285 In fact, if recent reports hold true, the current version of
their Conflict Minerals regulation is problematic since it seems to
only require direct importers of minerals to disclose sources, while
electronics companies are left off the hook and may disclose at their
discretion.286 Therefore, the European Union should focus on better
tackling disclosure issues and human rights if they decide to rework
their Conflict Minerals regulation after its passage.287
One suggestion may be to follow the steps of the Brownback
Bill and McDermott Bill, both of which called for increased
assistance to the Congolese by facilitating medical treatment,
humanitarian relief, rehabilitation services, and psychological
assistance, among others.288 Drafting a provision providing this type
of assistance and funding for individuals in affected countries
addresses the humanitarian goal that the US Congress had in mind
when passing Section 1502.289
Both USAID and ECHO are already deeply involved with
providing humanitarian assistance and relief to the Congo.290 The
European Union should try to expand ECHO’s responsibilities and
provide more focus on the victims of the Conflict Mineral trade.291
Admittedly, such a measure would increase costs to the government.
However, if the overarching goal is to help victims of violence and
armed conflict, this goal is seemingly within the reach of what ECHO
strives for: the provision of humanitarian aid and civil protection to
countries in need.292 Since ECHO is familiar with the Congo and its
conflict, the office should try to broaden its reach over countries
affected by conflict associated with mineral trade.293 Like the
285. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text (discussing the forthcoming EU
Conflict Mineral regulation).
286. See id.
287. See generally supra Section II.A.4.
288. See supra Section II.A.1.
289. See supra Section II.A.4.
290. See supra Sections II.A.3 and III.D.
291. See supra Section III.D (describing ECHO’s purpose and its current
responsibilities).
292. See id.
293. See id.
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Brownback Bill suggested, ECHO should increase protection and
services for communities adversely affected by the mineral trade,
strengthen the actual management and trade of natural resources, and
improve conditions and livelihood prospects of mineral miners.294
Additionally, ECHO should resemble the McDermott Bill by also
focusing on alleviating child labor abuse and providing protections
for these children.295 Perhaps, ECHO can try to help the Congo and
other affected countries develop a procedure where only individuals
of a certain age are allowed to work as miners.296 Although the Congo
does have laws in place limiting labor to children over the age of
sixteen, and dangerous labor to children over the age of eighteen, the
penalties in place for violating these provisions are inadequate.297
ECHO should focus on advising government offices tasked with
enforcing Conflict Mineral regulation.298 Perhaps ECHO can suggest
that EU government officials meet with Congolese government
officials to discuss strengthening the punishment for those who
violate child labor laws.299
CONCLUSION
In today’s world, where churning out profit for shareholders
often takes priority, the adverse effects of these moneymaking
business practices are often overlooked.300 As evidenced by failed
Conflict Minerals bills, the eventual passage of Section 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Act, and the current EU regulation process, many
individuals are no longer able to turn a blind eye to financing
practices that fuel violence and lead to death.301 Legislation focusing
on the situations that enable this conflict has had some beneficial
effects such as an increase in corporate transparency, the decrease in
sales of minerals not certified to be conflict free, and the
294. See supra Section II.A.1.
295. See id.
296. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the child labor laws in the
Congo, the Congo’s moderate improvement in combatting forced child labor, and suggestions
regarding increasing imprisonment penalties for those who force children to work in dangerous
conditions).
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See supra Section II.A.5.
301. See supra Introduction and Section I.C.
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demilitarization of armed forces said to contribute to the conflict in
the Congo.302
Because electronic devices, especially smartphones, are as
pervasive today as pay phones were decades ago, it is of great
importance to be a responsible consumer.303 Otherwise, there may be
a chance your smartphone is comprised of minerals mined under
devastating conditions, whether it be in the Congo or other countries
affected by similar conflict.304 It is difficult to be responsible without
transparency from the companies that sell these products.305 Without
proper disclosure, the cycle of unknowingly funding armed forces
facilitating violence within conflict-affected countries will only
continue.306 Fortunately, there has been a movement towards more
disclosure to avoid fueling conflict in other countries, as seen with
United States’ Section 1502 provision and the European Union’s
efforts towards creating a similar provision in their arena.307
However, our society is still far from meeting the humanitarian
goal of dispelling the conflict in conflict-affected countries.308 It sends
a powerful message that the United States and the European Union
are taking steps to combat human rights violations, but there is still
more that needs to be done.309 US Conflict Minerals regulation
seemingly neglects the individuals it was meant to protect.310 The
European Union can remedy this misstep by drafting its own version
of Conflict Minerals regulation with affected individuals in mind, and
perhaps the United States will follow suit to improve its own current
regulation.

302. See supra Section II.A.
303. See Introduction (discussing the link between Conflict Minerals in smartphones as
many devices contain minerals that may have originated from the Congo, thus giving rise to
the possibility of indirectly financing the dangerous conflict).
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See supra Parts II and III (examining the United States’ Conflict Mineral legislation
and regulation and the European Union’s pending Conflict Mineral regulation).
308. See supra Section II.A.5 (discussing the disadvantages of Section 1502 in the
Congo and its effects on the miners).
309. See supra Parts II and III (examining the United States’ Conflict Mineral legislation
and regulation and the European Union’s pending Conflict Mineral regulation).
310. See supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text; see also supra note 249
(discussing Congress’ intention in passing Section 1502: supporting the “humanitarian goal”
of combatting the violent conflict in the Congo and “promot[ing] peace and security.”)

